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Colonel Kemal’s apprehensions regarding the vulnerability of the Turkish positions along the ranges to the north of Anzac were well founded. Soon after they garrisoned the Outposts, the New Zealanders began actively scouting the complex of valleys and scrub-clad spurs leading up to the heights of Chunuk Bair and Kocacimentepe, Hill 971. In charge of this scouting activity was Major Percy Overton of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles. Overton had worked as a scout in the Boer War and he enhanced his reputation in this activity at Anzac.

Looking up from his outpost position, Overton could see the rear of the Turkish trenches at Baby 700 and a narrow strip of a saddle between two valleys which led up to Baby 700–the Nek. Any advance from Anzac towards the dominating peaks of the Sari Bair Range would have to take care of the enemy positions at the Nek. Overton’s task was to see if a way could be found for troops to move up the valleys and on to the range behind the Turks. In mid-May 1915, Overton began his reconnaissance of the ranges:

	I have been out on two occasions … outside our outposts and through the Turkish lines. The first time I took Corporal Denton and we had a great day together and gained a lot of valuable information for which General Godley thanked me. The last time I was out for two nights and a day and I took Trooper McInnes and Corporal Young. We had a most exciting and interesting time dodging Turkish outposts. I was able from what I saw of the country to make a map and gain much information as to the movements of the Turks, and would not have missed the experience for the world.
	[Overton, quoted in C Pugsley, Gallipoli – The New Zealand Story, London, 1984, p.218]

Overton’s discoveries were to alter the whole course of events on Gallipoli. British thrusts at Helles in early May failed to break the Turkish lines. A major Turkish attack on 19 May, which sought to drive the Anzacs back to the beaches, also failed with great loss. At Helles, and all along the Anzac line, the campaign by the end of May had entered a period of stalemate and trench warfare. This was the very sort of campaign the British Empire forces had sought to avoid at Gallipoli. Overton’s scouting reports from the Anzac outposts suggested a way out of this impasse.

The seaward slopes of the ranges north of Anzac, he discovered, were lightly held. Here, in this rugged landscape, the Turks did not expect to be attacked and they had consequently concentrated their forces to the south against Anzac and Helles. As Pugsley writes:

	From the Turkish perspective it was the Anzacs who were pinned against the sea, and the isolated Anzac outposts were to prevent the Turks breaking in rather than being a way for the Anzacs to break out.
	[C Pugsley, Gallipoli – The New Zealand Story, London, 1984, p.218]

But it was for a break-out from this area that the Anzac commanders now began to plan. Overton and other scouts had shown that it was possible, although difficult, to push a large body of troops up through the valleys or ‘deres’ and take the heights. From there they could come down behind the Turkish trenches surrounding the Anzac position. From there, also, artillery could range on the Turkish supply lines to Anzac and Helles to the east and perhaps, eventually, from there the successful advance across the peninsula, which had been sought for on 25 April, could be made.

Throughout June and July preparations and plans for the proposed break-out went ahead. British reinforcements were brought in to boost the Anzac garrison. The ‘long sap’ to No 2 Outpost was greatly widened to take mule carts bringing supplies to new dumps at No 2, from where it was envisaged a great attack into the ranges would commence. The battle plan itself was complex. On the afternoon of 6 August, in the south at Lone Pine, the 1st Australian Division would mount a strong attack on the Turkish trenches to draw in Turkish reinforcements and take their attention away from the northern ranges. Later, once night had fallen, a force of approximately 10 000 British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and Gurkha troops would make its way from North Beach to the outposts and then up the valleys and into the range.

The Australians of the 4th Brigade under General Monash were to take the most northerly route virtually to the end of the range and then work their way through the valleys to the highest peak of all–Kocacimentepe, Hill 971. The New Zealanders, supported by the British, Indians and the Gurkhas, were to move up the valleys and spurs above the outposts to seize the vital peak of Chunuk Bair. As this attack was proceeding in the dark of 6-7 August, a new British landing was to be made at Suvla Bay to the north. It was intended that, by dawn on 7 August, the heights would be taken and that an attack by Australian light horsemen could proceed across the Nek as the New Zealanders took Turkish attention away from the threat behind them. It was a bold plan aiming at nothing less than a campaign-winning stroke from Anzac.

Among those who were about to be called on for a supreme effort–the soldiers–there was some apprehension. Although reinforcements had arrived, many of the Anzacs had now spent over three months on the peninsula. During those early summer months they lived on a monotonous diet of bully beef, tea and hard biscuits. Sickness and disease were causing far more casualties than the enemy, and what had been a fine and healthy force in early May was now reduced to an army of thin gaunt-looking men. As he waited on 4 August to march up the seaward valleys of the Sari Bair Range to his death on Chunuk Bair, Colonel William Malone, the commanding officer of the Wellington Infantry Battalion, wrote:

	We are to move out soon, round left flank ... . No movement all day 6th and go out on night with rest of Brigade to take Chunuk Bair in a big combined movement against 971, Koja Temen Tepe. We are pleased to be moving, but the men are rundown and the reinforcement men are in a big majority, so I am not too sanguine about what we can do.
	[Malone, quoted in C Pugsley, Gallipoli – The New Zealand Story, London, 1984, p.271]

Others accepted the struggle ahead with stoic fatalism. Lieutenant E W Cameron of the 9th Australian Light Horse confided to his diary on 5 August:

	Ere another entry is made in this book we will have passed through a very trying time. We are leaving almost everything behind; whether we see it again or not will be a matter of luck. And now we go forward in the full consciousness of a ‘duty clear before us’, and … we can only say ‘Thy will be done’. God grant comfort to those in anxiety and sorrow and give our leaders wisdom.
	[Cameron, quoted in B Gammage, The Broken Years – Australian Soldiers in the Great War, Peguin Books, 1975, p.218]